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Abstract 
The use of compliance studies to evaluate the effectiveness of international 
human rights courts can produce misleading results because a focus on 
compliance considers the behaviour of only one stakeholder in the dynamic 
that is human rights adjudication: the state. A survey of petitioners in cases 
before the IACtHR, together with a review of literature surrounding strategic 
litigation before the Inter-American system, demonstrate how civil society 
organisations value the declarative justice provided by the Court, how they 
mobilise around human rights litigation and how adept they are at deploying 
rulings in such a way as to produce impact beyond compliance and even in the 
absence of any compliance at all.  
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In this article I engage critically with the idea that compliance rates alone can be used to 
gauge the effectiveness of an international human rights court. I highlight several 
conceptual and practical difficulties encountered in trying to measure compliance and in 
trying to use it to evaluate international human rights courts and ultimately I hold that 
compliance is too narrow an indicator of the impact that these courts have because it looks 
at the way that they affect only one stakeholder in the international adjudicative process: 
the state. I hold that in order to understand the dynamics through which human rights 
courts impact realities on the ground it is important to widen the scope of study to include 
broader non-compliance impacts that affect or are brought about by other recipients of 
international rulings, principally the civil society organisations that mobilise around the 
international adjudicative process and deploy pro-human rights rulings domestically in 
myriad ways.  
 
Thinking of the impact of human rights courts in this more extensive way allows us to 
understand why the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) is experiencing a 
consistent increase in relevance (as evidenced by increasing use of its individual petitions 
process against a steady number of states) while the rates of compliance with its rulings 
remain relatively low. Cases alleging violations of human rights that reach the Inter-
American Court are characterised by the important role played by civil society organisations 
in them, as petitioners, litigants and amici curiae. After surveying civil society petitioners in 
cases that reached the Inter-American Court I discovered a pattern whereby Latin American 
civil society organisations deployed litigation before the Inter-American system as part of a 
broader advocacy strategy and once they received a favourable ruling from the Court they 
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were generally very adept at using it to push for pro-human rights change domestically from 
the bottom up. This finding is supported by recent literature describing NGO involvement in 
the Inter-American human rights system and by published narratives of strategic litigation 
before the system. Both the survey and the aforementioned literature bolster my finding 
that, while compliance is important, the rulings of international human rights courts can 
have impacts beyond compliance and indeed, in the absence of any compliance at all from 
states.  
 
In the Latin American context in which the IACtHR operates, the focus on impact beyond 
and in the absence of compliance paints a more realistic portrait of how international 
adjudication in the field of human rights manages to alter realities on the ground. It also 
illuminates the ways in which human rights advocates have adapted to harness as much 
impact as possible in the context of states that are reluctant to comply with their human 
rights obligations. Finally, it clarifies the way in which the Inter-American individual petitions 
process operates in practice and counters the narrative that holds that the Inter-American 
Court is not an effective tribunal.  
 
2. The Paradox: Low compliance vs rising relevance in the Inter-American system 
 
A few years ago, while researching theories of international adjudication, I came across an 
article written by Eric Posner and John Yoo that engaged critically with the notion of judicial 
independence in international law1. They were writing in response to Lawrence Helfer and 
Anne-Marie Slaughter who had held, some years earlier, that judicial independence was key 
to what they called “effective supranational adjudication”2. Contrary to this assumption, 
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Posner and Yoo held that the most successful international adjudicative bodies were in fact 
those that were dependent on the will of the states that came before them. They developed 
an assessment tool that looked at three separate elements that could determine the success 
of the international court or tribunal: a) rates of compliance with the rulings of the body; b) 
usage rates and; c) overall success of the treaty regime. They said that international courts 
that were dependent on the will of states were used frequently by states and their rulings 
were generally complied with by those states.  They applied their model to two regional 
human rights courts: the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. While the European Court did not emerge unscathed from their analysis, the 
evaluation of the success of the Inter-American Court was particularly damning: “given the 
low usage and compliance rates, we can be reasonably confident in concluding that the 
IACHR has not been an effective tribunal”3. They had stated earlier that “[i]f a tribunal is 
ineffective, states will stop using it”4. 
 
As someone who was studying the Inter-American system of human rights this idea did not 
sound right. Over the years since the beginning of the Inter-American Court’s operation 22 
states have recognised the binding jurisdiction of the Court and only two have permanently 
withdrawn from the Court’s monitoring5. In addition, when I looked at the rate of individual 
petitions to the Inter-American system, the first step in the international procedure that 
could end in a ruling from the Court, I found that in the 29 years since the Court’s first 
merits ruling in the Velásquez Rodríguez case, petitions to the system have increased 
eighteen-fold6.  It appears that while compliance with the Court’s rulings is admittedly low, 
usage continues to increase on the part of petitioners and against a stable number of states. 
If compliance is a measure of effectiveness, and effectiveness determines usage, then this 
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pattern of low compliance and increasing relevance of the Inter-American system is a 
paradox. Far from falling into disuse, the system is currently struggling to manage an ever 
increasing caseload of individual petitions against a steady number of Latin American and 
Caribbean states.  
 
The question that arises then is: why are petitioners using the Inter-American system at 
increasing rates when compliance with the Inter-American Commission’s recommendations 
and the Court’s rulings is low? Put differently, what are petitioners getting out of the 
individual petitions process that makes going through a long, difficult, expensive and often 
dangerous procedure7 to get a case to the Court worthwhile?  
 
3. Impact as Compliance in human rights adjudication 
 
a. The importance of compliance 
 
Compliance is a central element in several analyses of international law and of international 
adjudication. In general terms, these studies hold that compliance can tell us something 
important about the effectiveness of the law in general and of international monitoring 
bodies in particular.  Compliance seems to be particularly captivating in international law 
because of the need that international lawyers have to convince others that international 
law is, in fact, law even though it is not enforced in the same way as other law is8.  When 
international law demonstrates a high rate of compliance it is easier to argue that it is law9. 
In addition there is the question of how useful the law is and consequently, whether it is 
worth the effort. International law may fit the bill in terms of formality and content, but if it 
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doesn’t work (meaning: if it doesn’t change the thing that we want changed) then why 
bother? 
 
A focus on compliance has led to several different sub-areas of study in the field of 
international human rights.  Some scholars are interested in determining how much 
compliance exists with the law and with monitoring bodies10. Likewise, others seek to 
understand why states comply with the law11. Finally, others attempt to develop strategies 
to increase state compliance, with scholars approaching the topic from several strategic 
positions, such as regime design12 and strategies that courts themselves can undertake to 
improve compliance13. In all of these works compliance features as something that should 
be conceptualised, measured and ultimately pursued. If we understand that the recipient of 
international human rights law is the state, then compliance can become the law’s most 
important impact.  
  
Studies that measure compliance purport to tell us how effective law and the institutions 
that enforce the law are in fulfilling their purpose.  When it comes to the compliance levels 
of international human rights courts, a court that achieves compliance has been understood 
as a well-functioning, effective court14, which is an idea that requires us to believe that 
courts are actually doing something to bring compliance about.  For example, Anne-Marie 
Slaughter and Laurence Helfer “measure the effectiveness of a supranational tribunal in 
terms of its ability to compel compliance with its judgments by convincing domestic 
government institutions, directly and through pressure from private litigants, to use their 
power on its behalf”15. 
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Compliance also appears to tell us something useful about states. Part of the power that 
international law has is that states like to be seen as good neighbours and respectful of the 
rule of law. A state that complies with international rulings may be perceived as law-abiding 
and trustworthy and may then be invited to participate in more and more international 
agreements. In contrast, a state that is openly hostile to complying with international rulings 
may not be considered by other states as a dependable trading partner, for example. States’ 
level of respect for international human rights law in particular affords them reputational 
benefits. In particular, states that are transitioning from authoritarian rule are often eager 
to rehabilitate their international images through human rights treaty ratification, 
submission to international monitoring and compliance with rulings. 
 
It would appear then, that the centrality of compliance in studies about the effectiveness or 
impact of international human rights law and adjudication is because it is considered a 
useful tool in evaluating the performance of the law and its monitoring bodies and of states. 
It therefore becomes imperative to understand what the term compliance means and to 
understand its virtues and its limitations.  
 
 
b. The problem with defining compliance. 
 
If compliance is such an important tool with which to measure the effectiveness of law and 
of adjudication, it is surprising how resistant it is to definition and thus, that most 
compliance studies do not specify their understanding of what the term means. Instead, 
studies that rely on compliance often appear to understand it as “conformity of behavior 
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with legal rules”16 which is a concept that is too vague to anchor something as important as 
effectiveness.  
 
Kingsbury argues that it is not possible to understand compliance without first locating it 
within a theoretical understanding of the law. Compliance, in this sense, will mean different 
things to different theorists17. In addition, to be able to study and to quantify compliance, 
we need a clear understanding of several practical factors, for instance: what does the 
international norm prescribe, who decides on the meaning of the norm, how will we 
evaluate the behaviour of the obligated party, who will determine if the behaviour displays 
characteristics that can be described as compliance? In this sense, Howse and Teitel point 
out that there is too little attention paid to interpretation in deploying compliance as an 
evaluative tool in international law18. 
 
Compliance in international human rights adjudication poses additional questions that 
become important when we look at characteristics of human rights reparations measures. 
One issue is determining how long states should take to comply. It seems obvious that once 
a reparations order is handed down, states should start to take steps to comply with it. But, 
what if they take too long? At what point in time does compliance become meaningless for 
the purposes of evaluating effectiveness? Take for example a state that has been ordered to 
pay monetary damages to a victim. Is payment in two months equal to payment after two 
years? What about ten years? If compliance is a tick-box exercise then on paper there is no 
difference between these options, but in practice the experience is very different for the 
victim who is to be compensated.  
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How much compliance is also an issue in international human rights adjudication; payments 
of damages appear straightforward enough for states but consider, for example that the 
state has been ordered to amend its constitution19 or reform its prison system20. How much 
behaviour conformity are we going to require of states and at what point are we going to 
consider the ruling complied with? Is it enough that the executive introduce a bill of 
constitutional reform or criminal justice reform into congress or will we wait until the 
political process, which can take years, runs its course? What if the end result does not fully 
implement the reparations ruling? Do we tick the box or not? 
 
c. Compliance is a spectrum. 
 
Part of the problem in conceptualising compliance is understanding it as a binary. In 
evaluating the effectiveness of the Inter-American Court, Posner and Yoo considered only 
full compliance as compliance at all21, even though they recognised that the Court ordered 
several different types of reparations measures22.  Choosing to consider only full compliance 
as relevant for the appraisal of an adjudicative body is a decision that’s theoretical 
underpinnings need to be explained because the ramifications of this methodological choice 
can radically change the way we evaluate the said adjudicative body. For example, one can 
argue that the gravity of human rights violations justifies withholding the label of compliant 
from states that have not secured full compliance yet, but this understanding is political and 
should be explicit in any study that uses this particular methodology precisely because it 
contributes to obscuring what human rights compliance looks like in practice.  
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A focus on only full compliance invisibilises different behaviours that have an impact on how 
human rights law operates on the ground. First, it invisibilises the practice of the 
adjudicative body that makes the decision to order multiple reparations measures in the 
same ruling and/or to order reparations measures that are hard to comply with. If Courts 
are evaluated based on their effectiveness and effectiveness is made up in large part of 
compliance rates, they could improve their evaluations by only ordering that states pay 
damages to victims, which is a reparation measure that states comply with more than 
others23. If they don’t choose this path and instead they require states to make structural 
changes in an effort to prevent violations from recurring, their compliance rates will likely 
be low, but does this mean that their rulings are not having an impact on the ground? I will 
explain infra why I believe that it does not. Courts can be presumed to be fully aware of the 
difficulties that states will face in implementing their decisions and so their choice to require 
complex and sometimes structural change denotes an ethos that needs to be acknowledged 
and studied.  
 
Second, a focus only on full compliance also invisibilises the state behaviour that can be 
classed as partial compliance. For example, under the full-compliance model, a state that 
has paid damages and apologised to victims but has not enacted prison reform is equally 
incompliant as a state that has completely ignored the ruling. In practice, there is a wide gap 
between these two states that is relevant for victims, advocates and for observers of the 
law. The focus on full compliance thus paints a picture of states that is not an accurate 
reflection of their efforts to repair victims and it paints a picture of human rights law 
implementation that is not a real representation of the effects that a ruling has on the life of 
victims.  
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It seems clear then that recognising partial compliance is important in order to get a real 
understanding of the impact that human rights rulings are having in practice. Having said 
that, while a focus on full-compliance allows unduly negative labels to be attached to courts 
and to states, if partial compliance is understood as compliance-enough, the opposite issue 
could occur. Where reparations are many and include measures that are complex or difficult 
to implement, states presumably know that full compliance will be hard to achieve and that 
partial compliance is easy.  A state can wear the hat of partial compliance if it implements 
just one of the many measures it has been ordered to comply with.  For example, it can 
apologize (a relatively easy task for an executive to accomplish) and then claim to have 
partially complied without ever having so much as paid damages to the victims.  Hillebrecht 
is right then that in a scheme where partial compliance exists in an undistinguished mass, 
states are incentivized to “comply with the lowest hanging fruit rather than to implement 
more durable human rights safeguards”24. 
 
The decision to deploy compliance rates as a tool to measure effectiveness should be taken 
with caution and should always be accompanied with a methodology that takes into 
account the nuances described above. That said, there are good reasons to consider that 
the use of even the most nuanced compliance studies paints an incomplete picture of the 
effectiveness of an international court and of the impact of the law generated by that court.  
 
d. Compliance is a limited indicator of impact.  
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There has been a push-back in recent years against the use of compliance as a measurement 
of effectiveness or impact25. Scholars have sought to develop more nuanced methodologies 
that address some of the shortcomings that a compliance approach has when used to 
evaluate international tribunals.  
 
The first big limitation of compliance studies is that they only look at the effect that 
adjudication has on one actor in the international legal dynamic. They focus on whether or 
not the ruling is able to change the behaviour of a particular state and therefore they 
invisibilise the effects that that ruling has on other actors. If we decide to look only at 
whether states decide to behave one way or another, we are failing to take into account the 
several other actors that contribute to the global legal order, the actions or inactions that 
they undertake and the impacts that the law has on their behaviour26. Compliance tells us 
nothing about the effects that the ruling has on petitioners who present the claim being 
adjudicated, on the court that has handed down the ruling, on international organisations 
that may have a stake in the adjudicative process. It likewise says nothing of the effects that 
the ruling has on other courts (domestic or international), on other states, other potential 
petitioners or on civil society. It tells us nothing about how the ruling is or is not used by 
academics or advocates; it tells us nothing of how the media cover the ruling or how it 
impacts domestic or international politics.  
 
Furthermore, studies that attempt to quantify compliance may be able to tell us whether a 
state has carried out the orders of an international court, but they don’t tell us why. Political 
scientist Lisa Martin pointed out that the biggest problem with using compliance as an 
indicator of the effectiveness of law is that it does not deal with the issue of causality, 
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meaning that while a state may comply with a legal rule there is no accompanying indication 
of whether the compliant behaviour was actually caused by the rule under study or not27. 
Further, as I stated above and as Kingsbury points out: “the assumption that conformity and 
non-conformity are binary is not an adequate reflection of international practice, in which 
degrees of conformity or non-conformity and the circumstances of particular behavior often 
seem more important to participants”28. 
 
Concretely, for the purposes of this paper, studies that look at the compliance rate of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights cannot explain the fact that the relevance of the 
Inter-American individual petitions process continues to increase among petitioners. For 
Posner and Yoo, low rates of overall compliance are correlated with low usage rates and yet 
petitions are increasing and states are almost all staying bound. Even if we look at more 
nuanced compliance studies that seek to quantify and describe partial compliance, we find 
that the measures most often complied with by American states are still complied with less 
than half of the time29. And yet more and more petitioners are turning to the Inter-
American system to resolve their claims of human rights violations. If we consider that 
taking a case through the individual petitions process is a slow, resource intensive and often 
dangerous process30, partial compliance seems like an inadequate incentive for petitioners. 
It stands to reason, therefore, that petitioners perceive the Inter-American system as 
capable of producing an impact that goes beyond its ability to influence state behaviour in a 
particular case.  
  
4. Impact beyond compliance in human rights adjudication 
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a. New approaches to international court evaluation 
 
While compliance does appear to be one facet of the impact that international adjudication 
can have, it is by no means the only facet. Academia is beginning to realign around several 
iterations of broader understandings of effectiveness as goal attainment, as impact or as 
authority. Shany, for example, constructs international court effectiveness around the 
ability of the court in question to attain the goals set for it by those that provided the court 
with its mandate31. While this notion is broader than that of state compliance with rulings, it 
still only looks at the interests of limited stakeholders, and because international courts are 
set up by states – or international organizations that are made up of states – it remains a 
state-centric theory in that it ignores the ways in which international courts can influence 
other stakeholders.  
 
Engstrom, on the other hand broadens the spectrum of evaluation of court performance 
enormously by saying that the Inter-American system “matters even in ways that are not 
captured through an examination of the impact of individual rulings and decisions”32. While 
I agree with his proposal to appreciate impact broadly to incorporate the many ways in 
which the system can produce effects, he does not offer a concept of impact so we are left 
to wonder where to draw the line in determining which effects are important enough to tip 
the scales in favour of the adjudicative body in question. Alter, Helfer and Madsen do 
attempt to provide such a framework by evaluating international courts according to their 
authority, which is understood as “a court’s ability to project its ideas and values about the 
law and to have these projections reflected by, or even internalised in, the actions of 
individuals, groups and organisations within society”33. This understanding has the virtue of 
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including a court’s impact on more stakeholders than just the state but its focus is on the 
court that, for whatever reason, is perceived to be authoritative with no regard to the 
content of the court’s rulings. What matters in this model is the court and “its ideas and 
values” and how the court behaves to make others adopt those ideas and values. It does not 
refer to the sometimes complex dynamic that exists in international law, between courts, 
states, international organisations and civil society. In human rights law, for example, it is 
often not the case that the ideas and values included in a court ruling originated in the 
court. They may have originated in a treaty or in a petition to the court, so whether or not 
they are picked up and implemented by a stakeholder may have little to do with how 
authoritative the court is and more to do with that stakeholder having had the ideas and 
values to start off with.  
 
b. How necessary is compliance to achieve impact? 
 
Engstrom states that “[c]ompliance might be necessary for effectiveness, but it is not 
sufficient”34. This reflects the current trend of expanding the concept of effectiveness to 
include but go beyond compliance. However, I hold that international human rights 
adjudication can have impact even in the complete absence of any compliance at all. This is 
because I understand the recipients of international court rulings to include many more 
constituents than just the states that receive adverse rulings from human rights courts.  
 
In a traditional state centric understanding of the way in which international adjudication 
works, the mechanisms that produce impact on the ground require action from the state 
that is obligated to implement the ruling. That model would look like this:  
PATRICIA PALACIOS ZULOAGA  
 
16 
 
 
 
 
In this model, petitioners activate the process by presenting a claim that their human rights 
have been violated, the international court makes a ruling that recognises that violation and 
that requires the state to make reparations, and the state implements the decision thereby 
benefitting the original petitioners. Impact in this model requires that the state comply. 
Consequently, where no compliance exists, no impact exists.  
 
Human rights law is seldom this tidy and to understand it in this way is to ignore many other 
impacts that human rights adjudication has. Even in the case of this compliant state the 
ruling has other impacts. For example, the content of the ruling (and the compliance by the 
state) can serve as an incentive for other petitioners to take their cases to the international 
adjudicative system. The ruling can be used as precedent in domestic litigation on the 
human rights in question; it will likely be publicised in media outlets, it will be taught in law 
International 
human rights court
State
Individual 
Petitioners
1. Activation of the process. 
2. Ruling 
3. Compliance. 
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schools, it will be discussed over dinner. The ruling has the potential, therefore, to inform 
the discourse that surrounds the particular topic of the ruling. 
 
It seems clear then that a human rights ruling can have an impact beyond compliance; a 
further issue is whether an international human rights ruling that holds a state responsible 
for a human rights violation can have impact in the absence of compliance. If we understand 
that in human rights adjudication there are more stakeholders than only states and if we 
understand impact broadly – as a collection of changes that come about because of a 
human rights ruling or because of how a human rights ruling is deployed by stakeholders - 
then the answer is yes. In fact, many of the non-compliance impacts mentioned when 
talking about a compliant state will occur where compliance is missing. The ruling can still be 
invoked as precedent in domestic law (whether in the state that received the ruling or in 
other states35), it will still be publicised by the media, it will still be taught and written about 
by academics and, with enough media coverage, it will still be talked about over dinner. If 
the shaming of a state is considered valuable by victims, then a ruling that is favourable to a 
victim but not complied with by a state may still serve as an incentive to other potential 
petitioners. Non-compliance itself may reinforce an important narrative surrounding the 
state that certain sectors of society are seeking to push: namely that the state in question 
does not respect the law.  
 
This model of impact regardless of compliance would look like this: 
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c. Impact from the bottom up.  
 
The idea that international law can have impact despite a lack of compliance by states was 
well explored by Beth Simmons who studied how human rights treaty ratification affected 
the way that human rights were experienced on the ground. Simmons’ study offered 
copious empirical evidence to strongly suggest that the mechanisms for impact in human 
rights law do not come from outside the state but rather from within it36.  She 
demonstrated that within a state that is a party to an international human rights treaty, 
domestic stakeholders take international norms and use them in a variety of ways to 
provoke policy change within the state.  
“Scholars of international relations are often pessimistic about the ability of 
international law to influence human rights practices because they are largely 
looking in the wrong direction: outward at interstate relations rather than inward at 
state-society relations”37. 
International 
human rights court
State
Individual 
Petitioners
1. Activation of the process 
2. Ruling 
 
4. Extra-compliance impact. 
3.Compliance or 
non-compliance 
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According to Simmons’ work, the ratification of human rights treaties affects the domestic 
arena by allowing domestic stakeholders to alter the national agenda of priorities, to 
leverage litigation and to empower political mobilization38, which ultimately produce pro-
human rights impact within the state.  For her, it is not surprising that the mechanism for 
human rights law impact is bottom-up and located internally because “nobody cares more 
about human rights than the citizens potentially empowered by these treaties”39.  Human 
rights treaty ratification becomes a powerful tool for those residing within a state party to 
push for change, a method of pressure that is more direct, more reliable and, as Simmons 
demonstrates, more effective than relying on action from outside actors.  
 
This model of impact from the bottom up was developed with regards to treaty law, but it 
can likewise be applied to the rulings of human rights courts, particularly if we consider that 
these courts are closely observed by several different groups of domestic stakeholders that 
include human rights civil society organisations, domestic lawyers and domestic politicians. 
All of these stakeholders are capable of producing change domestically and they are all 
looking for support in that endeavour. If that support comes from a court made up of 
“jurists of the highest moral authority and of recognized competence in the field of human 
rights”40 the chances that their mobilisation will bring about change will increase.  
 
It is important to note, however, that impact that occurs in the absence of compliance will 
often not be related to the reparations measures ordered by the international court and will 
therefore not replace compliance. For example, an international human rights court may 
order a state to pay compensation to a victim of torture and arbitrary detention and to 
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apologise to them. In the event that the state refuses to comply, domestic stakeholders can 
still mobilise around the ruling; they can use it to shame the state, they can organise public 
demonstrations condemning the attitude of the state, they can work with opposition media 
to keep the issue at the forefront of public debate and they may eventually be able to 
harness enough public support to push the legislature to enact pro-human rights prison 
reform. But the victim in the original case has still not received the reparations that they are 
owed by the state. Therefore, it is important to be clear about what extra-compliance 
impact can mean in practice and who it benefits from it. In the example above, the 
experience of the general population of prisoners in the state has likely improved as a result 
of the ruling and the mobilisation surrounding it, but the original victim in the case, while 
welcoming the reform, may still feel that the ruling, and indeed the whole petitions process, 
did nothing to make their life better. That said, while it is important to recognise that the 
victim’s right to reparation has not been respected, it would be wrong to reduce the impact 
that the court ruling has to only the victim or to only those who would benefit from the 
concrete reparations measures that were ordered. Such an approach would render 
domestic stakeholder mobilisation around the international individual petitions process 
invisible and thus contribute to obscuring the way in which human rights litigation fits into 
the broad and complex advocacy strategies that civil society has developed in their efforts 
to improve respect for human rights. 
 
5. The impact of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights  
 
a. America41 and its Court 
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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was created by the American Convention on 
Human Rights in 196942 and its initial purpose was “the application and interpretation of the 
American Convention on Human Rights”43, which says little about the criteria which we 
should use to evaluate its effectiveness. What’s interesting is that this international effort to 
further human rights accountability in America contrasts sharply with the political landscape 
of the continent at the time and in the decades that followed, which was riddled with 
dictatorships that showed brazen disregard for human rights.  
 
i. Bad Faith 
 
There are several salient aspects of the context in which the Inter-American Court operates 
that are important to note if we are to understand the way that it has evolved and the 
impact that it has in the region. First and foremost is that this court has consistently been 
asked to adjudicate in cases of gross and systematic violations of human rights where the 
states that come before it have demonstrated alarming levels of bad faith, both in the 
commission of the violations in question and in their behaviour before the system organs. 
The first case that the Court ruled on is an excellent example of this; Honduran student 
Manfredo Velasquez Rodriguez was disappeared by plain clothes military officers and the 
state denied for years that he had ever been detained. No serious investigation was carried 
out and no habeas corpus petition lodged on his behalf was ever effective44. In the most 
egregious demonstration of bad faith, two witnesses for the victim were murdered, one 
before and one after they testified45. At that time there was no international recognition of 
forced disappearance as a crime and given that Velasquez Rodriguez’ body was never 
discovered, the Court found itself in the unenviable position of adjudicating a case where, 
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despite there being a widely acknowledged practice of forced disappearance in Honduras, 
they had no domestic investigation, no evidence and no law. Despite this scenario the Court 
came down on the side of justice in making a decision against the state that demonstrated 
that it was not going to allow a state to take advantage of its own bad faith when it came to 
gross and systematic violations of human rights. To do this it deployed a remarkable amount 
of judicial creativity to create the crime of forced disappearance by stitching together 
violations of the rights to liberty, integrity and life, by inverting onus probandi rules and by 
finding the state responsible for violations committed by non-state actors46.  
 
In the years that followed the Velasquez Rodriguez case the Court continued to develop a 
body of jurisprudence that interpreted the law to fit violations on the ground, that adjusted 
procedural rules to tackle the bad faith of states and that created a mechanism to protect 
victims and witnesses from reprisals47.  
 
The reparations ordered by the Court have also evolved to fit the context of gross and 
systematic violations that populate the Court’s docket. This is particularly relevant for the 
argument that I am trying to make in this article because the Court has not shown any 
inclination towards making it easy for states to comply. Inter-American Court rulings often 
contain long laundry lists of reparations measures that range from apologising to victims 
and paying damages to ordering legal reform and ensuring the prosecution of those 
responsible for the violation48. The Court’s evolution in terms of reparation reached new 
heights in the Case of the Cotton Field, where the Court pioneered the use of transformative 
reparations because restitutio in integrum would not fix the structural discrimination faced 
by women in Juárez that led to the state’s tolerance of their murders49.  
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ii. Transitional states 
 
Given the enormous complexity of many reparations rulings handed down by the Court, it is 
not clear cut to say that the lack of compliance with these rulings is necessarily down to bad 
faith on the part of states. Certainly there are states that flat out refuse to comply, 
preferring international shaming to the domestic cost of conceding a victory to their political 
opponents50. Others however, may struggle with the mechanics of achieving full compliance 
domestically. This is because another contextual issue that becomes relevant when talking 
about compliance and impact in the context of the Inter-American Court is that the length 
of proceedings between the violation and the final ruling is so long that often states that 
receive an adverse ruling are not necessarily run by the governments that committed the 
violations but instead are somewhere on a long and complicated transition to democracy.   
Transitional states can be characterised by weak institutions and power-sharing and can be 
led by an executive that wishes to comply but is politically unable to force domestic 
institutions to carry out the reparations measures directed to them. For example, where the 
legislature, the judiciary or the armed forces are loyal to the previous regime it will likely be 
impossible for the executive to achieve legislative reform or criminal prosecution of 
perpetrators. This is an issue that has come up repeatedly in cases where states have 
enacted amnesty laws that prevent the prosecution of crimes committed by prior dictatorial 
governments51.  
 
Where compliance is not impossible, it is at times considered too costly by a weak 
transitional government that prefers to explain away the international shame by saying that 
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preserving the terms of their democracy is more important than achieving full compliance 
with a single case ruling.  
 
iii. Partial compliance with IACtHR rulings  
 
In this context of gross and systematic violations, multiple reparations measures and weak 
democracies, it becomes very clear that studies that look only at full compliance are not 
adequate to gauge the impact that a ruling has in general but also not even adequate in 
measuring the behaviour of individual states with regards to a ruling handed down against 
them.  
 
The most accurate measurement of state compliance with rulings of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights to date was carried out by Darren Hawkins and Wade Jacoby. They 
developed a methodological structure for measuring compliance that took into account that 
reparations rulings are made up of several different measures and then tabulated 
compliance with each individual measure and not the ruling in toto.  They collected all of the 
rulings for which there existed compliance reports at the time of their study and they broke 
down the reparations ordered into specific categories of measures.  They then coded each 
measure as complied with or not complied with according to the Court’s own evaluation of 
compliance contained in its compliance reports52.  They also, when measuring compliance, 
adjusted their findings to account for how long it took a state to comply, creating a measure 
that they labelled “resistance” and which reflects “the extent to which a state delays in 
complying with an order”53.  This is an important caveat to make: while two states can be 
understood as equally compliant if they have both carried out the measures ordered of 
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them, it is an entirely different scenario on the ground if the first state complied 
immediately and the second state complied after ten years.  Hawkins and Jacoby, were 
therefore able to introduce a level of nuance into the study of compliance with Inter-
American Court rulings that does not exist in other studies.  The only caveat to add to their 
study is that it does not account for the changing characteristics of reparations rulings over 
time.  Reparations ordered by the IACtHR have evolved and have grown increasingly 
complex over the years54.  Today’s Court is ordering significantly more reparations than it 
did in the 1990s or the 2000’s; therefore Hawkins’ and Jacoby’s finding that compliance has 
increased since 2003 might be – in part - a reflection of the fact that the Court is ordering 
more and more specific measures than it did before55.  While this finding may require 
specification, their overall measurements of compliance hold strong. 
 
Hawkins and Jacoby’s main finding is that the most prevalent behaviour of states ordered to 
repair human rights violations by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is one of partial 
compliance.  They found that in the cases for which there existed compliance reports states 
fully complied with all measures ordered in 6% of cases, they complied with no measures 
ordered in 11% of cases and they complied with some parts of the ruling in the remaining 
83% of cases56.  They concluded from these general figures that “[i]n any given case, states 
rarely do all they are ordered to do.  But by the same token, states rarely do nothing at 
all”57. While this study was published in 2011, the Court’s compliance reports over the past 
seven years support the idea that this trend has continued58.  
 
Hawkins and Jacoby’s methodology also allowed them to identify which reparations 
measures were complied with more often. In this sense, they found that the highest rates of 
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compliance were found in conjunction with the payment of moral damages and the 
payment of the costs and expenses of taking the case to trial, both of which are complied 
with 43% of the time59.  Only slightly less complied with are the payment of material 
damages and the requirement to apologize, with an overall compliance rate of 40%.  All 
other measures of reparation were complied with significantly less.  The authors then 
adjusted these results according to their resistance level, i.e. how long states took to 
comply, and found that the same four reparations measures being complied with the most 
were also generally complied with faster than the rest60.  
 
iv. Civil Society Mobilisation  
 
A final contextual characteristic that is important to grasp in order to understand the impact 
that rulings of the Inter-American Court can have is the intense engagement of civil society 
organisations with the individual petitions process. This engagement can be seen since 
Velásquez Rodríguez where the original petition was presented by his family along with four 
domestic and international human rights NGOs61. In the thirty eight years since that initial 
petition it is easy to observe how NGOs have taken a preponderant role in presenting cases 
to and litigating cases through the Inter-American System all the way to the Court. This is in 
large part because the Inter-American System recognises an actio popularis, whereby the 
petitioner in a case need not be the victim themselves or have a close relationship with the 
victim. This open petitions model has been particularly significant due to the fact that 
victims in cases that come before the Court are often members of marginalised 
communities that would not otherwise have the tools to access the justice system 
themselves. In this sense, the Court has ruled on cases where the victims have been political 
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prisoners, homeless children, incarcerated children, remote indigenous communities, etc. In 
fact, my own examination of the procedural narratives of cases that reached the court 
yielded that around 74% of petitions that the Court ruled on between 1988 and March of 
2017 were presented by at least one named civil society organisation62. Petitioners often 
include a mix of domestic and international NGOs who pool their resources to litigate cases 
effectively; the domestic NGO often has a close relationship with the victims and access to 
evidence while the international NGO often has greater resources and litigation expertise63.  
 
Another way that NGOs participate in the procedure before the Court is as amici curiae both 
with regards to contentious cases and advisory opinions64. The amici role allows NGOs 
(along with academics, international organisations and states) to attempt to guide the Court 
in its ruling and often provides voice to advocates who are not party to the litigation itself. 
 
Finally, it’s also worth noting that members of civil society organisations and cause lawyers65 
who have represented victims before the Inter-American System have also at times been 
elected to positions of influence in the system. For example, two of the lawyers who 
litigated the Velásquez Rodríguez case before the system later went on to become 
Commissioners on the IACHR66. This fluidity in roles, at least with regards to positions on the 
IACHR, requires the acquiescence of states who ultimately vote a candidate into their post, 
and it’s therefore a good example of how complex the dynamic relationship between states, 
civil society and system organs is. It further allows us to understand another way in which 
ideas flow from civil society towards the Inter-American system (and the States involved) 
and why the system organs have maintained a strong connection to the human rights NGO 
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field. It also gives us some insight into why this regional system is the source of some of the 
most progressive human rights jurisprudence in the world.  
 
The fact that civil society organisations participate intensely in cases that come before the 
Court and that they continue to do so despite low levels of full compliance suggests that 
their mobilisation around the individual petitions process is motivated by more than an 
expectation of obtaining full compliance. The fact that these organisations continue to 
present cases at increasing levels despite the high costs of doing so, the length of 
proceedings, low rates of compliance and the very real danger that they face by engaging in 
this work suggests that civil society organisations in Latin America are using international 
human rights litigation as part of broader advocacy strategies that have impacts that are not 
measurable by looking only at compliance.  
 
6. Human Rights litigation as a part of a broader advocacy strategy: A survey of 
petitioners in cases that reached the Inter-American Court of Human Rights67. 
 
My contention in this paper is that there exist impacts brought about by the Court’s rulings 
(and the petitions process itself) that are important enough to drive petitioners to the Inter-
American system and that are not susceptible to measurement by compliance studies, 
which are too narrow in scope to account for all of the effects that an international court 
ruling can have. It is therefore important to elucidate what in fact motivates petitioners to 
bring cases to the Inter-American system and push them all the way to an Inter-American 
Court ruling.  
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Given that the majority of cases that result in rulings from the Court are presented by civil 
society organisations, I put together an online survey that sought to collect data on the 
priorities that led these petitioners to make decisions before, during and after litigation 
before the Inter-American Court.  To this end, I studied the procedural narratives of all of 
the rulings handed down by the Court from 1986 (Velásquez Rodríguez) to the end of 2012 
(Uzcátegui et al) and put together a database where I identified the petitioners in each case.  
I decided to survey those organizations and specifically where possible the persons (often 
lawyers) that were in charge of making the decision to petition the system and the 
procedural decisions thereafter. Being that the purpose of the research project was to 
identify impacts that can be sought by those who want to produce change domestically, and 
given that Beth Simmons’ framework identifies that those most interested in such change 
are domestic stakeholders68, I decided to survey only domestic NGOs and not the handful of 
international NGOs that bolster the litigation once it becomes international.  While some 
cases were brought by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch/Americas in the 
early years of the Court’s jurisdictional work, these organizations do not now generally 
litigate individual cases before the Court.  By far the most prolific international litigator is 
CEJIL – the Center for Justice and International Law - and its motives are clearly set out in its 
publicized mission statement which declares that its founders had: “the goal of creating a 
regional organization that would fight for justice, liberty, and a dignified life for the 
continent’s inhabitants through a concentration of efforts on the use of international law, 
compliance with human rights, and the Inter-American System’s mechanisms of 
protection”69.  They are dedicated to the use of strategic litigation to better the lives of 
people on the ground in America; in order to do that they often partner with domestic 
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NGOs.  It seemed much more important, for the purposes of my study, to survey these 
domestic organizations whose work and strategies vary from case to case.  
 
For all of the cases studied, I identified and contacted 150 petitioning domestic NGOs.  The 
survey was designed to provide petitioners with the opportunity to explain why they 
thought that litigating their case internationally was worth their while and how rulings of 
the Court are useful to them70.  It is important to note that this was a survey of perception 
and not fact and there are many things that can influence a petitioner’s perception of the 
litigation process and their state’s behaviour.  Furthermore, the fact that participation in the 
survey was voluntary and that it collected data regarding the litigation of 32 of the 154 cases 
included in the study (twenty percent of cases) means that we cannot conclude that the 
answers received constitute a definitive study of the opinions of the petitioners’ pool as a 
whole or even the pool of petitioners in cases that reached the Court.  We can however say 
that they suggest petitioner trends and help us to elucidate the possible extra-compliance 
impacts of the rulings of this Court. 
 
a. Results of the Survey 
 
The survey collected data on a wide range of perceptions and litigation decisions regarding 
32 cases that the Inter-American Court issued merits rulings on between 1988 and 201271;   
and all data remains on file. The most relevant information for the purposes of this paper is 
summarized in the following section; all responses have been anonymized in order to 
protect the respondents.  
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i. Why did you present your case? 
 
The survey included two questions designed to reveal the petitioning NGO’s motives in 
deciding to bring the case to the Inter-American system. The first asked respondents to 
freely narrate why the NGO decided to present the petition to the IACHR. The majority of 
respondents said that they made the decision due to a lack of domestic justice. This 
formulation suggests that they believed that justice could be achieved internationally. 
Several different iterations of the same idea included references to domestic impunity and 
an ongoing search for justice. Having said that, they did not elaborate as to what the term 
“justice” entailed. 
 
In at least two surveys the respondents said that they brought the cases to the system to 
pursue injunctions that would put an immediate stop to ongoing violations regarding victims 
who were imprisoned72. In other surveys the respondents wrote openly about using the 
Inter-American system to visibilize a domestic human rights problem or to pursue a 
favourable precedent from the Inter-American system73. 
 
When asked further along in the survey what they wanted to achieve by presenting the 
specific petition to the system, many insisted again on the objective of attempting to attain 
justice. In addition, some respondents answered that their main objective was the 
reestablishment of the rights of their clients, including those imprisoned74. They also 
opened up about wider objectives that they had, most notably, calling attention to the 
human rights violations occurring in the state, establishing precedents and shaming the 
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state75.  Some talked about applying political pressure on the state, both domestically and 
internationally. For example: 
“To present an emblematic case of forced disappearance […] so that it would shock 
the public and thus pressure the authorities to make sure to investigate human 
rights violations committed during that time”76. 
Another said:  
“pursuing the case and obtaining a judgment would help us apply political pressure 
to the [state] government and its supporters in the international community, 
including the OAS and the U.S.”77 
In at least two cases the respondents stated that their main objective was to expand the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American system regarding a particular oppressed group78. 
 
Many of the answers to these two questions suggest that from the outset NGOs were not 
only interested in obtaining compliance with reparations ordered. Visibilization, state 
shaming and the establishment of a useful precedent can all come about regardless of 
compliance.  
 
ii. Did you pursue compliance? 
 
When asked whether or not they sought compliance from the state an overwhelming 
majority of respondents said that they did. 
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While extra-compliance impact may exist then, compliance remains important to most 
petitioners surveyed.  If it was not they would not spend time and resources attempting to 
achieve compliance. However, it’s important to remember that the rulings of the Inter-
American Court often contain many different reparations measures, some of which 
transcend the victim to address broader social issues that caused or facilitated the violation. 
That being the case, pursuing compliance with these broader measures might fit well among 
the activities that the NGO is already carrying out. So while NGOs do dedicate time and 
resources to pursuing compliance, we shouldn’t understand that the necessarily stop their 
other advocacy efforts to do so.  
 
iii. Was your ruling complied with? 
 
The pattern of compliance with the Court rulings in the respondents’ cases followed the 
model of partial compliance observed by Hawkins and Jacoby. One respondent reported 
80.6%
19.4%
Did you attempt to obtain compliance with the ruling domestically?
Yes
No
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that the ruling had been completely complied with; three said that no compliance existed 
and; a large majority reported that some degree of partial compliance had occurred79. 
 
However, the survey then asked: Do you consider that reparations have been complied with 
in your case?  Here, the respondents were only given two options: yes or no.  At the time of 
designing the survey I was already aware that states generally complied with some parts of 
the rulings and generally did not comply with others.  The fact that the present question did 
not account for partial compliance forced the respondents to consider whether or not they 
perceived partial compliance was enough to consider a state “compliant”.  While we know 
from previous written answers that the majority of cases had some degree of compliance, 
respondents overwhelmingly considered the reparations not complied with.   
 
 
This may be an indicator of a general valuation of total compliance over partial or non-
compliance but it can also indicate that the petitioners value the measures that have not 
been complied with over those that have.  In fact two thirds of respondents listed various 
19.4%
80.6%
Do you consider that reparations have been complied with in your 
case?
Yes
No
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reparations that had been complied with and yet only 6 considered that the state was 
compliant. If we recall that Hawkins and Jacoby’s study indicated that the Inter-American 
Court reparations measures that were complied with the most were the payment of costs 
and damages and the requirement to apologise, whereas those with the lowest rates of 
compliance were those that required states to end impunity and effect systemic change, it 
makes sense that a petitioning NGO might value the broader reparations measures more 
and thus consider a state incompliant until they are achieved. It could also be true that 
labelling a partially compliant state as incompliant serves a broader identity narrative about 
the lawlessness of the state. 
 
iv. Is there any extra-compliance value to a ruling in favour of the 
victim? 
 
The survey then delved deeper into the question of how much compliance or a lack thereof 
mattered to petitioners, many of who were taking significant risks to achieve a ruling. The 
results were striking:  
 
100.0%
0.0%
For the victim, is there any value to a ruling from the Inter-American 
Court even if the state does not comply or will probably not comply?:
Yes No
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The written answers that accompanied the yes/no choice here spoke of the declarative and 
symbolic meaning of the ruling, of the importance of being recognized as a victim, of being 
restored in dignity80 and having their names cleared.  They also spoke of the fact that even if 
the rulings were not complied with, there remained the possibility that they could be 
complied with in the future.  Many of them said that the ruling was a measure of justice in 
itself for the victims.  This is consistent with the idea that for petitioners, justice is not a 
function of compliance with a ruling but can be found in the recognition of the hardships 
suffered and the allocation of the status of victim/survivor of human rights abuses. In this 
sense, the ruling contributes to the construction of a narrative about the victim and, if we 
consider that for a case to get to the Court the state must have denied that victimhood for 
many years, the ruling serves to rewrite – ultimately correct - the official story. In the 
context of gross and systematic violations that are so prevalent in cases that come before 
the Court, a declaration from the highest Court in the region that the state was wrong to do 
what it did is a tremendously important expression of justice for victims and petitioners.  
 
 
100.0%
0.0%
For your NGO, is there value to a ruling from the Inter-American 
Court even if the state does not comply or probably will not 
comply?
Yes No
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Here, the written answers told of their perception of the ruling as a tool to keep fighting for 
compliance with regards to the specific case and also for other cases.  Some spoke of the 
importance of truth, and that the ruling could be used to ensure that the events did not 
happen again.  One said it raised the profile of the organization and helped build a good 
reputation, several noted the experience that they gained during the litigation.  
 
Similarly to victims, petitioning NGOs that have been working in a context of gross and 
systematic violations also benefit from the validation that the ruling provides in terms of 
public image and from the rewriting of the truth narrative after human rights violations. In 
addition, the perception of the ruling as a tool instead of an end is illuminating; it suggests 
that in the absence of compliance petitioners understand that they can still use the ruling as 
part of a broader strategy to achieve goals that encompass but go beyond individual justice 
for the victim. This understanding supports the idea that human rights NGOs play an 
important role in pushing the system organs to address human rights violations and in 
deploying the rulings to create change, and that they should therefore be understood as 
stakeholders in the international adjudicative process.  
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Here, all but one of the respondents answered that there was value for third parties.  This 
value was identified primarily as the establishment of precedents for future litigation and 
the definition of international standards that could be applied to similar cases.  There was 
also mention of the importance of the establishment of the truth, which would benefit 
society as a whole.  
 
v. Is there any value to a ruling against the victim? 
 
A very different set of answers emerged when the same three questions were asked with 
regards to a ruling that did not condemn the state.  Here almost two thirds of respondents 
answered that they could think of no benefits for the victim.  
96.8%
3.2%
For third parties, is there a value to a ruling from the Inter-
American Court  even if the state does not comply or probably 
will not comply?
Yes No
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The few respondents that could find a benefit noted the moral victory of fighting the state 
for what was right.  
 
When asked about benefits in favor of the NGO that could come about from a ruling in favor 
of the state, the situation was gloomier still with over three quarters of respondents failing 
to find any value in the ruling if they lost their case.  
 
 
35.5%
64.5%
For the victim, are there any benefits to a ruling in favor of the 
state?
Yes No
22.6%
77.4%
For your NGO, are there any benefits to a ruling in favor 
of the state?
Yes No
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For the most part, those that found benefits spoke of the moral victory of fighting for 
human rights, even if they did not win.  
 
Finally, when asked if there was any possible value to a ruling in favor of the state for third 
parties, around half of the respondents found that there could be; most of them mentioned 
a strengthening of the rule of law and the possibility that the ruling could still contain some 
useful precedents.  
 
 
The collection of the answers to the last six questions sheds a lot of light on what is 
important for petitioners.  First and most strikingly, the value of a ruling is not tied to 
compliance; this is demonstrated by the fact that all of them found value in a favorable 
ruling even where compliance was not feasible.  Second, what does seem much more 
important to petitioners is the content of the ruling, namely the condemnation of the state.  
Wherever that condemnation is lacking, the value they ascribe to the ruling drops 
dramatically.  This finding lends support to the idea that the declarative and symbolic nature 
of the ruling is very important and very useful to petitioners and that the value of 
declarative justice is not affected by the state’s decision to comply or not. Truth is 
48.4%
51.6%
For third parties, are ther any benefits to a ruling in favor of the 
state?
Yes No
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mentioned as a goal throughout the surveys and must be valued by observers of the system. 
The fact that the Court supports a certain narrative of events that casts them as human 
rights violations and that it declares that the state was wrong to treat the victim in the way 
that it did are tremendously important discursive benefits of litigation, particularly when 
understood the context of propaganda and misinformation that characterises states that 
commit gross and systematic violations. The possibility of finally obtaining an official 
endorsement of the truth can make litigation worth it for petitioners.  
 
vi. Did you return to the petitions process? 
 
Crucially, when asked whether, after presenting their first claim, they had presented 
another, the overwhelming majority said that they had. This question sought to illuminate 
whether, in the opinion of the petitioning NGO, the experience was worth it, i.e. if the 
hardship, the long time and resources spent, the danger to their personal integrity and 
reputation and the lack of compliance made them think that the experience was not worth 
the effort or if on the contrary, despite all of those hardships they got enough out of the 
experience to do it all over again.   
 
83.9%
16.1%
After you presented your first claim, did you ever present 
another case to the Inter-American system?
Yes No
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In 83.9% of cases surveyed petitioners decided to present a claim to the system again, even 
when almost all of them did not experience full compliance with their first ruling.  This is yet 
another indication that petitioners have motivations other than achieving full compliance 
and that they found a way to use the process and the ruling they obtained to further their 
goals. 
 
vii. How did you deploy the ruling domestically? 
 
I then went on to ask civil society petitioners what they did to draw attention to the 
litigation and what they did with the ruling once it was handed down. In terms of publicizing 
their cases, just under two thirds of respondents said that they employed a media strategy 
during the examination of the case before the Inter-American system. In three cases 
surveyed the respondent said that the lack of a media strategy was due to a lack of 
resources and contacts with the press, suggesting that the lack of a strategy was not due to 
it not being deemed useful81. For some, the deployment of a media campaign was a 
fundamental part of their overall advocacy strategy. For example: 
• “There was a media strategy at all times, including press releases, the publication of 
reports and books, events and public fora, a webpage within our website, etc.  
Where possible, everything was put out in English and Spanish”82. 
• “All of the actions were broadcast through domestic mass media, radio, TV and 
newspapers, so that society could know about the case and also so that they would 
overcome their fear of reporting similar cases”83.   
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• “The media strategy is a fundamental component of legal defense for [the NGO] and 
it consists of acts of visibilization agreed upon with the victims.  In the case of [the 
victims], it was employed during the whole process and was intensified when the 
cases came before the Inter-American Court”84.  
•  “The media was our ally, it constantly broadcast and informed”.85  
The deployment of a media strategy is indicative of a highly organized NGO that 
understands its role as more than just a litigator. NGOs can use media strategy as part of a 
litigation strategy; use the litigation as part of a larger social action strategy; or both. It is 
important to remember that while declarative justice may exist in a ruling independently of 
any other stakeholder action, many non-compliance impacts require NGOs to work hard to 
make the legal process accessible to their audience and to craft a message about it that fits 
their broad advocacy goals.  
 
With regards to how the NGO used the ruling the survey asked: “Has the ruling featured in 
any other document produced by your NGO? If so, please detail. (eg: NGO website content, 
shadow reports to other international monitoring bodies, domestic law suit, publicity 
campaign, education campaign, information about your NGO, finance report, funding 
proposal, parliamentary lobby, networking efforts, etc.)”  The answers collected show that 
the NGOs use the rulings in many, if not all of the examples listed.  Several respondents 
answered that they used it in all the examples.  Most predominant was the placing of the 
ruling on the organization’s website.  There were also many cases of use of the ruling in 
media campaigns, in capacity building courses, in domestic litigation, in shadow reports, in 
funding proposals.  Some respondents mentioned academic articles that they or their 
colleagues had written on the basis of the rulings. Most notably, one NGO said that:  
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“…the ruling has been useful for those [nationals] who are suffering political 
persecution and who are asking for political asylum or refugee status and are facing 
deportation from the USA and Canada, [it is useful] for the NGO when coming before 
immigration authorities in favor of those persecuted…”86 
The answers to this question are the clearest indicator yet that petitioning NGOs deploy the 
rulings strategically to create impact regardless of compliance by the state.  
 
viii. What did you achieve by bringing this case to the Court?  
 
The final set of responses that are relevant to this paper came when the petitioners were 
asked to identify the impact of the ruling they had gotten from the Court. When asked “In 
your opinion, what was the impact of the ruling domestically?” respondents were again 
asked to compose their own answers freely.  They reported a broad array of impacts 
including discursive change, alternate truth narratives, and domestic legal changes. For 
example: 
“The ruling proved that in our country human rights are definitely violated and that 
institutions do not do their jobs”87.  
“It has been cited in some cases to exclude evidence obtained under torture and it 
has been put to good use in the national campaign against the use of military courts 
in cases of human rights violations”88.  
“The lives of indigenous groups became more visible and we were able to see state 
practices that apply parts of the standards achieved”89.  
“It had a big positive impact, especially in the search for justice, in a country with a 
militaristic culture and where soldiers thought they were untouchable…”90.  
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 “The ruling from the Inter-American Court was well received because the media 
highlighted that no human rights violation should lack investigation”91. 
 “…a trial was opened against Alberto Fujimori, former president of the country, who 
was sentenced to 25 years”92. 
“The […] cases have contributed in that legal system operatives now use their 
reasoning: lawyers, civil and military courts”93. 
 
One of the most common answers had to do with what respondents called the visibilization 
of certain issues.  It is apparent that before the ruling they were not able to interest the 
media or public opinion in the issue that concerned them and that resorting to the 
international legal process before the Inter-American system gave them the exposure that 
they needed.  Several respondents also mentioned that the rulings were being used in 
pleadings and in the sentences of domestic judicial bodies and by policy makers.  The most 
striking impact was the stay of execution of 35 death row inmates, a development that the 
respondents themselves call “a de facto suspension of the death penalty”94.  
 
While the overwhelming majority of surveys collected respondent perceptions of impact 
that were positive, in one case the respondent was unable to report a positive impact: 
“It was rejected by [state] authorities and ignored”95. 
 
When asked to break down the impacts by beneficiaries and identify the importance of the 
ruling for the victim, for the NGO and for third parties the respondents went into more 
detail.  Regarding their perception of the importance of the ruling for the victim, they 
answered, for example: 
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“Moral vindication”96. 
“Very important because it largely vindicates part of the historic truth and the 
violations committed and it brought them some (though few) reparations”97. 
“After the ruling the victim felt repaired and happy on an emotional level.  After the 
ruling he was given political asylum […] which had been under review”98. 
“It was important, they felt listened to and that their reality was paid attention to”99.  
“That it is possible to achieve justice and try to reach the truth”100. 
“Fundamental.  Vindicating”101. 
“…Our view, from what we have been told, is that it was very important: getting a 
favourable ruling has contributed to the rebuilding of their life project.”102.  
“In a way, they felt dignified”103. 
“It helped clear [the victim’s] name, provided him some protection from 
persecution”104. 
“Might have saved his life”105. 
When asked to identify the importance of the ruling for their NGO they answered, for 
example: 
“Very, because it visibilizes and helps to establish the standards that are applicable 
to several structural problems”106. 
“Our NGO became known as able to help victims of torture, persecution and political 
imprisonment; we were also recognized by the [state] Bar Association and other 
NGOs”107.  
“It positioned the organization as one of the most important in [the state] in the field 
of strategic litigation of human rights”108. 
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“Great importance, the rulings confirmed many complaints that we had been 
presenting about the impact of militarization on indigenous communities […] 
especially on women”109. 
“It is important because it is an achievement and a tool for the work that we do”110. 
“It raised our profile, and helped build our credibility”111. 
 
When asked about the importance of the ruling for third parties many wrote about the 
value of precedent and the value of truth. Others saw the ruling as a tool that victims and 
human rights NGOs can work with domestically. For example:  
“Some judicial actors have taken up the case and in general it has helped to make 
the state feel scrutiny and pressure from the international community”112.  
“It was important to denounce human rights violations, because sooner or later we 
will get some results”113. 
“For society, so it may know the truth…”114 
“It is a precedent in cases where similar violations can happen, or in the best of 
cases, it would stop similar events happening again”115.  
“It is an incentive to take other cases to the Inter-American system”116. 
 
While this survey is not a qualitative study of petitioners, it does point to some important 
indicators of the motives that take them to the Inter-American petitions system and all the 
way to the Court. What motivates these petitioners is a desire to achieve justice after a 
human rights violation and to further their advocacy efforts, and while they do value 
compliance, their understanding of justice and the usefulness of the process is not 
contingent upon whether or not or to what degree the state complies with the ruling in 
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their case. They care very much about the discursive nature of the ruling that they get, 
particularly in that it is seen to condemn the state. In this sense, they value a pro-victim 
understanding of the truth of the violation; the vindication of the victim; the visibilisation of 
the issues that they work on and; the creation of precedents. Most notably, they consider 
Court rulings as advocacy tools and they are very good at mobilising around the process and 
the ruling to create extra-compliance impact.  
 
The answers provided by petitioners lend support to the idea that we should stop 
considering states as the only recipients of the law that is created through international 
human rights adjudication. Human rights NGOs use the individual petitions process 
strategically and they work hard to maximise the impact of litigation both before and after 
the ruling is handed down.  All of this work and all of its effects have gone unnoticed by 
studies that focus on state compliance as the only impact of international litigation. If we 
consider civil society organisations as stakeholders in the process, then it becomes a lot 
easier to see the impacts that rulings have and that NGOs bring about independently of 
compliance, and even in the absence of any compliance at all.  
 
7. NGO Mobilisation around the Inter-American Individual Petitions Process.  
  
The survey responses were collected in 2013 as part of a broader study of the litigant 
experience before the Court. Current data collected and published by the Inter-American 
system organs on petitions, together with recent literature on NGO involvement with the 
Inter-American petitions process, support my assertion that petitioners' motivations when 
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bringing cases to the system continue to have less to do with compliance and more to do 
with wider advocacy goals. In this sense, petitions to the Inter-American system have 
continued to rise and the prevalence of domestic and international NGOs among the pool of 
petitioners in cases that reach the Inter-American Court remains high (74% across all cases 
until and 76% in cases against Latin American states from 1988-2017117). Many NGOs 
present more claims after obtaining a ruling that was not fully complied with, including 
several of the petitioners that I surveyed. CEJIL remains the most prolific litigator before the 
system and in general, petitioning NGOs in cases that reach the Court continue to represent 
victims whose mistreatment is symptomatic of broader human rights problems within Latin 
American states. 
  
Several authors have contributed studies of NGO involvement in the Inter-American 
system.  For example, Heidi Nichols Haddad provides an account of how human rights NGOs 
have permeated the Inter-American system since the '70s and '80s by assisting first the 
Inter-American Commission and then the Inter-American Court in the performance of their 
functions. Haddad posits that the relationship between the system organs and NGOs, most 
notably large NGOs with well-established reputations, is deep and reciprocal118, and in the 
latter part of the twentieth century included those NGOs advising and assisting the 
Commission in the processing of individual petitions119. Engstrom on the other hand points 
to the mobilisation of civil society groups within the framework provided by the Inter-
American system as a characteristic of "the development of human rights as a field of 
political practice in Latin America"120.  
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Together with Low, Engstrom then goes on to note that recourse to the Inter-American 
system can provide NGOs with opportunities to frame the issues that they care about within 
the language of human rights and to thus reap legitimacy benefits from that framing121.  
Furthermore, they hold that NGOs also benefit from interacting with the Inter-American 
system because of identity formation processes which come about either because the NGO 
becomes more professional itself or because it manages to re-label the groups of people 
that they mobilise for as vulnerable or deserving of special protection122. All of these effects 
of interacting with the Inter-American system are valuable for petitioning NGOs and none of 
them rely on whether or not the state against which the NGOs mobilise is compliant with 
rulings from the system organs.  
  
A good example of these types of impacts can be seen in Anaya and Campbell's account of 
the litigation of the Awas Tigni case against Nicaragua. Several foreign and international 
NGOs came forward to support the indigenous community in their struggle to pressure the 
state to recognise and protect the collective rights of indigenous communities to land and 
resources123. In addition to their aims with regards to the specific situation lived by the 
victims in the case, the advocates also sought a ruling that would acknowledge these rights 
as human rights and thus locate them within the discourse of the universal and inalienable. 
When the Court ruled that the rights to land and resources of the indigenous community 
were understood as part of the right to property under article 21 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, it "signal[ed] that indigenous peoples' rights to ancestral land 
and resources are a matter of already existing international law derived from the domain of 
universally applicable human rights"124. This understanding would allow the case to be used 
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as precedent in Inter-American cases against Suriname, Paraguay, Belize and the USA125, as 
well as to inform legal arguments based on property rights elsewhere in the world. To apply 
Engstrom and Low's framework to this case: the location of indigenous rights within the 
scope of human rights legitimised and universalised them and at the same time 
reconceptualised indigenous peoples as deserving of special protection. The ruling had far-
reaching effects in terms of discourse and issue-framing that were not at all affected by the 
state's slow trek towards compliance.  
  
Another way in which the literature has presented extra-compliance effects of Inter-
American Court rulings is in describing the impact that the Velásquez Rodríguez ruling had 
on domestic NGOs that were struggling to find avenues of pressure against Latin American 
States. This ruling appears to have become not only a beacon signalling that a new 
opportunity for justice had opened up, but also a roadmap for how to achieve a favourable 
ruling from the Court. For example, Haddad provides interviews with key players who noted 
the increase of cases brought to Human Rights Watch after their success with Velásquez 
Rodríguez and that at that time NGO Global Rights also started to use the individual 
petitions process126. Engstrom and Low likewise explain how the Velásquez Rodríguez ruling 
was employed by NGO APRODEH in the framing of cases of massacre and forced 
disappearance committed by Peruvian authorities127. Their purpose in doing so was to not 
only to obtain a binding ruling that would support their narrative surrounding abuse by the 
state, but also to obtain a "useful tool to deploy in its domestic political advocacy work"128. 
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Scholars have provided further accounts of how NGOs have employed litigation before the 
Inter-American system as an avenue to pursue advocacy goals that go beyond redress for 
the specific victim. NGOs have used Inter-American litigation to challenge amnesty laws in 
the southern cone129, to improve the treatment of rape survivors and the quality of 
reproductive healthcare in Peru130 and to suspend the extraction of oil from indigenous 
land131 among many more examples.  Carvahlo and Baker discuss Global Rights petitioning 
the IACHR for a precautionary measure soon after the murder of an indigenous leader as a 
way to "give visibility to what was happening in Mato Grosso do Sul"132. In terms of how 
NGOs use Court rulings to further their advocacy goals, Hudlet and González explain how 
Inter-American Court rulings in four cases brought by NGOs against Mexico were deployed 
by another NGO before domestic courts to restrict military jurisdiction in a separate case of 
human rights violations committed by the armed forces133.  
  
A recent example of how the availability of the Inter-American system's protection 
measures has influenced how NGOs mobilise is included in Cavallaro et al's account of civil 
society mobilisation after the disappearance of 43 students in Ayotzinapa, Mexico in 2014. 
In that case representatives of the victims' families announced their intention to seek 
precautionary measures from the Inter-American Commission shortly after the students 
disappeared134. The Commission has played an important role in investigating the case and 
pressing the state for action ever since135. This deployment of an individual protection 
procedure early in the timeline of a disappearance indicates that NGOs on the ground are 
well-prepared in that they have the knowledge and the technical expertise to trigger 
international monitoring quickly. It also suggests that they are well-aware of the advantages 
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of deploying the monitoring of the Inter-American system organs as well as the important 
extra-compliance impacts their involvement brings about, namely that engaging the 
Commission allows NGOs to visibilise and afford urgency to issues, to shape evolving 
narratives and to pressure states to take concrete measures to remedy ongoing violations.  
  
The preceding narrative serves to illustrate that trends that were suggested by the survey of 
petitioners are supported by the work of scholars who are interested in the complex 
relationship between NGOs and the Inter-American system organs. It is apparent that NGOs 
that petition the system in cases that reach the Inter-American Court do so to obtain redress 
for the victims of state abuse, but that they are also motivated by the possibility of 
obtaining impacts that go beyond compliance with reparations for the victim in particular, 
many of which are sought and harnessed regardless of the attitude of states parties.  
 
8. Conclusions 
 
I set out to challenge the idea that international human rights courts, and in particular the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, can be adequately evaluated with compliance 
studies. Theoretically and practically, compliance is a far more complicated notion than it 
would appear to be at first sight. Therefore, studies that employ compliance to measure the 
effectiveness of international human rights courts should be designed in such a way as to 
properly capture the nuances of each particular system of international adjudication. Even 
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where compliance can be measured in a sophisticated way, there exist many extra-
compliance impacts that are not susceptible to measurement with these studies.  
 
An examination of the perceptions of NGO petitioners in cases that reached the Inter-
American Court, along with studies of NGO interaction with Inter-American system organs 
and narratives of strategic litigation before the system, support the assertion that 
petitioners value compliance but they also value and seek out impacts that are not 
measurable by using compliance studies. Focussing on compliance, particularly the more 
limited concept of total compliance, invisibilises a number of impacts that rulings have and 
that affect stakeholders other than the state. These independent impacts can be just as 
important as compliance or more so, depending on the stakeholder and the context. In this 
sense, the Inter-American Court is a good example of how extra-compliance impact can be 
valued and sought out by petitioners. Ultimately, while petitioners do value compliance, 
they seem to value a notion of declarative justice independently of compliance and they see 
the rulings of the Court as tools to further their advocacy. They work hard to bring about as 
much impact as possible during the litigation and once the ruling is published. It is this 
understanding of justice and their ability to deploy the process and the ruling strategically 
that are powerful enough to push them through the long and arduous process of bringing a 
claim to the Inter-American system and that then keep them coming back for more. 
 
It was Simmons who stated that: 
“much research suggests that litigation's power resides not so much in its ability to 
provide every victim with a decisive win in court. Litigation is also a political strategy, 
with the power to inspire rule revision and further to mobilize political movements. 
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It can often be used strategically not only to win cases, but also to publicize and 
mobilize a cause"136. 
The key to solving the Inter-American paradox of low compliance and rising relevance that 
gave origin to the present article is to understand that civil society organisations are 
autonomous stakeholders in international adjudication who have evolved to find ways to 
pursue human rights justice in the face of hostile states. If we open our understanding of 
international adjudication to include human rights NGOs as both initiators of international 
monitoring and recipients of international law, we are able to visibilise a range of extra-
compliance impacts that had been obscured by a focus on compliance. In this way, properly 
valuing these extra-compliance impacts allows us to understand that the behaviour of 
petitioners to the Inter-American human rights system is not actually paradoxical at all.  
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